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i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether an objectively incorrect statement of opinion
is actionable under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77k, only if it was subjectively disbelieved by
the defendant.
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1
INTEREST OF AMICI
Amici are legal scholars who write and teach about
the common law as it bears on issues of current regulation,
including issues of misrepresentation and false opinions.1
They include scholars in the fields of contracts, torts,
criminal law, remedies, consumer law, and securities
regulation. Samuel W. Buell is Professor of Law at Duke
Law School, where his research and teaching focus on
criminal law and regulation of corporations and financial
markets. James D. Cox is the Brainerd Currie Professor
of Law at Duke Law School, where he teaches and writes
about corporate and securities law. Deborah DeMott is the
David F. Cavers Professor of Law at Duke Law School,
where her teaching and scholarship focus on tort and
corporate law and the law of agency. She also served as
reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Agency, published
in 2006. Christopher L. Griffin, Jr., is Assistant Professor
of Law at William & Mary Law School, where he teaches
and writes about torts and the law of remedies. Ann M.
Lipton is a Visiting Assistant Professor at Duke Law
School, where she teaches and writes about securities
litigation. Lauren E. Willis is Professor of Law at Loyola
Law School Los Angeles, where she teaches and writes
about consumer law and contracts. She is also an Adviser
to the Restatement (Third) of Consumer Contracts.

1. This brief has been fi led with the written consent of the
parties, which fi led blanket consents with the Clerk of Court.
Pursuant to Rule 37.6, counsel for amici affi rms that no counsel for
a party authored this brief in whole or in part, nor did any person
or entity, other than amici or their counsel, make a monetary
contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The core of Petitioners’ position is that “[t]he only ‘fact’
conveyed by a statement of opinion or belief is the fact that
the speaker held the stated belief. It naturally follows that
such a statement can be ‘untrue’ as to a ‘material fact’
only if the speaker did not actually hold the stated belief.”
Petitioners’ Brief at 11. That is not, however, what this
Court said in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501
U.S. 1083 (1990); it is not even the position taken by the
Second and Ninth Circuits. Even those courts that have
read Virginia Bankshares as requiring both subjective
and objective falsity have nonetheless presupposed that
an opinion statement may be objectively false.
That is also the clear position of the common law,
both as it existed at the time the Securities Act was
drafted and today. Across a variety of fields—from the
torts of misrepresentation and defamation to rules of
contract and restitution—the common law acknowledges
that opinion statements may be objectively false if they
imply underlying facts, and that they may be actionable if
made by a person who stands in a relation of trust to the
recipient, purports to be an expert, or has special access
to facts. The circumstances in which opinion statements
triggers liability at common law tracks the circumstances
involved in securities litigation under § 11 of the 1933 Act,
and the Act is best read as incorporating those exceptions.
Petitioners’ position is particularly untenable with
respect to statements of law. Petitioners maintain that
“[a]n assertion of legal compliance cannot be definitively
true or false at the time it is made except in the rare
case in which a court has already definitively ruled
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on the legality of the issuer’s actions.” Petitioners’
Brief at 34-35. This extraordinary position seems to
question the very notion of a rule of law. The common
law, however, is far more nuanced. It recognizes that
many statements on legal matters imply the existence
of underlying facts, such that the legal statements can
be actionable as misrepresentations if those facts do not
exist. It also acknowledges that lawyers frequently have
more information and expertise than the recipients of
statements about the law, and that they frequently stand
in a relation of trust to those recipients. Moreover, the law
has frequently had to confront legal uncertainty on some
points, and in many areas—including qualified immunity,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, and habeas corpus—it has developed
effective tools to separate opinions about legitimately
uncertain legal questions from legal judgments that are
simply and objectively wrong. As with opinion statements
generally, the circumstances of a securities registration
statement under the 1933 Act fit particularly well with the
situations in which the common law makes legal judgments
potentially actionable.
ARGUMENT
I.

The common law provides both the background
against which Congress legislated in the Securities
Act of 1933 and contemporary insight into the
general question of opinion falsity.

This br ief focuses on common law pr inciples
concerning misrepresentations and opinions, including
the special case of opinions about the law. The common
law is relevant in two distinct senses. When Congress
enacted the Securities Act in 1933, it legislated against a
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common law background that informed the content of the
Act and continues to provide insight into what Congress
had in mind. The common law and federal securities law
also continue to share certain basic questions, and the
resolution of those questions in one area may shed light
as to how to proceed in the other.
Section 11 of the Securities Act imposes liability
based on a registration statement’s inclusion of an “untrue
statement of a material fact or omi[ssion] to state a
material fact . . . necessary to make the statements therein
not misleading.” 15 U.S.C. § 77k. Congress enacted this
provision against the background of the common law of
misrepresentation and deceit. See, e.g., 7 Louis Loss, Joel
Seligman, & Troy Paredes, Securities Regulation 426,
434 (4th ed. 2012). To be sure, “the courts have repeatedly
held that the fraud provisions in the SEC Acts . . . are
not limited to circumstances that would give rise to a
common law action for deceit.” Id. at 435. As then-Judge
Alito stated, “[i]t is well known that the federal securities
laws provide broader fraud protection than the common
law, having been enacted in response to the common law’s
perceived failure at stamping out fraud in the securities
markets.” MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co., 426 F.3d
204, 218 (3d Cir. 2005). Nonetheless, “conceptions familiar
in the common law are retained” in § 11, including the
need to identify “a matter of ‘fact’ as distinguished . . .
from one of ‘opinion.’” Harry Shulman, Civil Liability
and the Securities Act, 43 Yale L. J. 227, 249 (1933). How
the common law treated that question—and in particular,
how it dealt with the sort of circumstances that arise in
the context of a securities offering—is instructive as to
what Congress intended in the 1933 Act. And because
Congress intended to supplement common law liability,
“it seems reasonable to assume at the very least that the
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most liberal common law views on these questions should
govern under the statutes.” Loss, et al., supra, at 434.
The common law is also relevant in a second sense. As
a leading treatise says, “[i]t is obvious from the language
[of the SEC statutes] that some of the basic problems are
the same—what is false, what is a fact, what is material.”
Loss, et al., supra, at 434. This case concerns what is
false. As Petitioners assert, that is a question under all
the federal securities laws—under § 11 of the 1933 Act
as well as under the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act
and SEC Rule 10b-5. But the same question has required
an answer under the common law of torts, contracts, and
restitution. The interaction of the First Amendment with
the common law of defamation, for instance, has forced
courts to distinguish particularly carefully between what
is a falsifiable fact and what is a non-falsifiable opinion.
For this latter reason, it is useful to consider not only
the common law as it appeared to Congress in 1933, but
also contemporary principles and decisions that may shed
light on the parallel problems posed by the securities laws.
We have accordingly cited decisions and commentary that
postdate the 1933 Act alongside materials that would
have been available to the Act’s drafters. In any event,
the law displays considerable consistency over time on the
principles relevant to this case.
II. Under the common law and this Court’s decision
in Virginia Bankshares, opinions may be both
subjectively and objectively false.
The common law rule, reflected across the spectrum
of tort, contract, and related fields, is that “a claim for
misrepresentation lies only for misrepresentation of a
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fact.” 2 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 477, at 1364
(2001). But although this rule “is often broadly stated
. . . in fact courts recognize a number of undermining
exceptions”; hence, “liability may be imposed for false
and material misrepresentations of opinion when the
defendant is a fiduciary, when he is a disinterested person
or an expert upon whom the plaintiff can justifiably rely,
when he has special knowledge, and when the opinion
implies material facts.” Id. at 1365. These exceptions
presuppose that opinion statements may be objectively—
as well as subjectively—false. And they track quite
well the circumstances that actually exist in securities
transactions. In fact, it makes sense to think of § 11 as
codifying not the general rule but rather the exceptions
that the common law always recognized for statements of
opinion from fiduciaries who possess special expertise and
knowledge of the facts, and whose conclusions frequently
imply the existence of such facts.
A.

Virginia Bankshares and the Courts of Appeals
requiring subjective falsity presuppose that
opinions may be objectively false.

This Court rejected the core of Petitioners’ position in
Virginia Bankshares when it observed that “statements
of reasons or belief . . . are factual in two senses: as
statements that the directors do act for the reasons given
or hold the belief stated and as statements about the
subject matter of the reason or belief expressed.” 501 U.S.
at 1092. Much as Petitioners argue here, the defendants in
Virginia Bankshares argued that opinion statements—
such as the claim that the merger price was “high” or its
terms were “fair”—are too “indefinite and unverifiable”
to be capable of falsification. Id. at 1093. But the Court
rejected that argument:
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The objection ignores the fact that such
conclusory terms in a commercial context are
reasonably understood to rest on a factual basis
that justifies them as accurate, the absence
of which renders them misleading. Provable
facts either furnish good reasons to make a
conclusory commercial judgment, or they count
against it, and expressions of such judgments
can be uttered with knowledge of truth or
falsity just like more definite statements, and
defended or attacked through the orthodox
evidentiary process that either substantiates
their underlying justifications or tends to
disprove their existence.
Id. Immediately following this passage, the Court cited
Day v. Avery, 548 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1976), a common
law misrepresentation decision turning not on subjective
falsity, but rather on doctrines that recipients of opinion
statements may, in certain circumstances, rely on those
statements as representations of underlying facts. See id.
at 1026-27. And the Virginia Bankshares Court concluded
that “[i]n this case, whether $42 was ‘high,’ and the
proposal ‘fair’ to the minority shareholders, depended on
whether provable facts about the Bank’s assets, and about
actual and potential levels of operation, substantiated a
value that was above, below, or more or less at the $42
figure, when assessed in accordance with recognized
methods of valuation.” 501 U.S. at 1094.
It is thus simply wrong to attribute to Virginia
Bankshares the view that “[b]ecause a statement of
opinion ‘by definition’ is a statement about what the
speaker believes, the jury could have found the statements
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at issue to be false as to a ‘material fact’ only insofar as the
statements falsely conveyed the directors’ actual opinion.”
Petitioners’ Brief at 17 (citing Virginia Bankshares, 501
U.S. at 1090). This Court clearly did not view opinion
statements as only falsifiable in a single sense (subjective
falsity). Rather, the Court said that such statements “are
factual in two senses.” 501 U.S. at 1092 (emphasis added).
Justice Scalia confi rmed this understanding when he
read the Court’s opinion to require both subjective and
objective falsity. Id. at 1109 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and in the judgment). Amici do not agree with Justice
Scalia’s reading on that point, but for present purposes
the critical point is that any notion that both subjective and
objective falsity are required presupposes that, even for
opinion statements, both subjective and objective falsity
are possible.
By denying that objective falsity is even possible,
Petitioners have cast themselves adrift from the courts
of appeals whose reasoning they purport to defend. The
Second Circuit explained in Fait v. Regions Financial
Corp., 655 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2011), that “[r]equiring
plaintiffs to allege a speaker’s disbelief in, and the falsity
of, the opinions or beliefs expressed ensures that their
allegations concern the factual components of those
statements” (emphasis added); see also Rubke v. Capitol
Bancorp, Ltd., 551 F.3d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding
that opinion statements support a § 11 claim only if “the
statements were both objectively and subjectively false or
misleading”) (emphasis added). Petitioners’ position seems
to be that opinion statements can only be subjectively
false, but no court has adopted that view.
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B. The common law of tort likewise treats
opinions as objectively false and therefore
actionable in a variety of situations.
Virginia Bankshares’s holding that opinion statements
may be objectively false rested fi rmly on the common
law. The common law deals with misrepresentations and
statements of opinion in a number of different areas,
including not only the tort of misrepresentation or deceit
but also the tort of defamation and the law of contract and
restitution. The Securities Act was enacted to go beyond the
common law standards of liability for misrepresentations.
Nonetheless, as Virginia Bankshares’s reliance on Day
v. Avery attests, the common law sets an important
baseline. As to false statements of opinion, the 1933 Act
embodies—at a minimum—the particular application
of well-established common law doctrine to the context
of a registration statement issued to purchasers in the
securities markets.
The common law plainly recognized that statements
of opinion may be false in a number of ways. Day v.
Avery recognized that an opinion statement “ordinarily
would not be a sufficient predicate for [a tort action for
misrepresentation] as between parties truly dealing at
arms’ length.” 548 F.2d at 1025-26. 2 The court noted a
number of exceptions, however, based on “circumstances
that would lead the reasonable person to believe that
implicit in the prediction or opinion is an assertion of fact
2. See also Sydney Edward Williams, Kerr on Fraud and
Mistake 53 (1929) (“A representation, to be material, should be
in respect of an ascertainable fact, as distinguished from a mere
matter of opinion.”).
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upon which the recipient . . . might prudently rely.” Id. at
1026. These circumstances include “[w]here the person
making the representation occupies a fiduciary or other
position of trust”; “where the speaker may reasonably be
understood as having based an opinion or prediction on
facts that are unavailable to the listener either because
he does not have access to them or because he is obviously
incapable of interpreting them”; and where “one who
asserts that a future event will come to pass impliedly
warrants that he knows of no fact that will prevent its
occurrence.” Id. at 1026-27.
Section 539 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
recognizes a similar rule:
(1) A statement of opinion as to facts not
disclosed and not otherwise known to the
recipient may, if it is reasonable to do so, be
interpreted by him as an implied statement
(a) that the facts known to the maker
are not incompatible w ith his
opinion; or
(b) that he knows facts sufficient to
justify him in forming it. 3
3. See also Restatement of Torts § 539 (1938) (articulating
a similar rule); Williams, supra, at 53 (“It is often fallaciously
assumed that a statement of opinion cannot involve a statement
of fact. But if the facts are not equally known to both sides, a
statement of opinion by the one who knows the facts best often
involves a statement of a material fact, for he implicitly states that
he knows facts which justify his opinion.”).
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This provision confirms the second sense in which
Virginia Bankshares recognized an opinion may
represent falsifiable facts—that is, as “statements about
the subject matter of the reason or belief expressed.”4
The commentary to this section emphasizes that opinions
imply underlying facts “particularly when the maker is
understood to have special knowledge of facts unknown to
the recipient.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 539 cmt. b.5
The distinction between fact and opinion is most
developed in the law of defamation. At common law,
“[t]he expression of opinion was . . . actionable in a suit
for defamation, despite the normal requirement that
the communication be false as well as defamatory.”
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 cmt. a. In Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974), this Court
held that “[t]here is no such thing as a false idea. . . . But
there is no constitutional value in false statements of
fact.” That holding did not, however, result in all opinions
being immune from defamation suits; rather, tort law
distinguishes between “pure” and “mixed” expressions
4. See also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 901
A.2d 106, 115 (Del. 2006) (“When the recipient does not know the
facts, he may justifiability rely upon [the] implied assertions and
recover on the basis of a misrepresentation of implied fact.”).
5. The Restatement (Second) gives the example that
“when an auditor who is known to have examined the books of a
corporation states that it is in sound fi nancial condition, he may
reasonably be understood to say that his examination has been
sufficient to permit him to form an honest opinion and that what
he has found justifies his conclusion. . . . [H]e is subject to liability
if he has not made the examination, or if he has not found facts
that justify the opinion, on the basis of his misrepresentation of
the implied facts.” Id.
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of opinion. Pure statements of opinion occur “when the
maker of the comment states the fact on which he bases
his opinion of the plaintiff and then expresses a comment
as to the plaintiff’s conduct, qualifications or character,”
or when “both parties to the communication know the
facts or assume their existence”; in each situation, “[t]he
statement of facts and the expression of opinion based
on them are separate matters.” Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 566 cmt. b. “Mixed” statements, on the other
hand, occur when these conditions are not met; hence, “the
expression of the opinion gives rise to an inference that
there are undisclosed facts that justify the forming of the
opinion expressed by the defendant. To say of a person
that he is a thief without explaining why, may, depending
on the circumstances, be found to imply the assertion
that he has committed acts that come within the common
connotation of thievery.” Id.
Mixed defamatory statements of opinion are actionable,
notwithstanding the First Amendment, because they are
treated as including a defamatory statement of fact that,
if false, is unprotected. See Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 566 (“A defamatory communication may consist of a
statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of
this nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation
of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the
opinion.”).6 Under this rule, “[i]t is the function of the court
to determine whether an expression of opinion is capable of
bearing a defamatory meaning because it may reasonably
be understood to imply the assertion of undisclosed facts
that justify the expressed opinion about the plaintiff or
his conduct.” Id.
6. See also id. cmt. c; Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d
910, 913 (2d Cir. 1977).
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The critical point is that all of these defamation
rules focus on the opinion’s objective falsity; they thus
stand as counter-examples to Petitioners’ extraordinary
claim that opinions may be false only in a subjective
sense. At common law, subjective falsity was irrelevant
to defamation; except in peripheral cases, defamation
was a strict liability offense. See id. § 580B cmt. b. Gertz
held that the First Amendment requires not only that
the defamatory statement be untrue but also that the
defendant have some degree of fault, but aside from public
figures negligence remains sufficient. See 418 U.S. at 34647; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580B(c) & cmt. c. The
defendant’s subjective belief is relevant to this question
of fault, but “a mistaken belief in the truth of the matter
published is not sufficient to amount to a bar” to liability.
Id. § 581A cmt. h. Falsity, in other words, is an objective
question; subjective belief is relevant only to scienter.
C.

The common law of contracts and restitution
likewise permit liability even without subjective
falsity for misrepresentations of opinion.

Although securities fraud claims generally descend
from the common law of misrepresentation and deceit,
tort law’s concept of fraudulent misrepresentation is not
an ideal analog for § 11 of the Securities Act, because tort
law requires scienter for fraudulent misrepresentation
while § 11 does not. Contract law, by contrast, defi nes
a “misrepresentation” simply as “an assertion not in
accordance with the facts.” Restatement of Contracts
§ 470(1) (1932). The commentary makes clear that “[m]
isrepresentation of itself implies neither conscious error
nor negligence on the part of the person making the
misrepresentation. It may be innocent or known to be
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false.” Id. cmt. a.7 The remedy for misrepresentation
in contract—similar to the measure of damages in § 11
cases—is rescission and restitution. 8
The common law of contracts makes clear that
liability for misrepresentations involving statements of
opinion is not limited to cases of subjective falsity. The
fi rst Restatement of Contract treats matters of opinion in
§ 474, which says that “[a] manifestation that the person
making has no reason to expect to be understood as
more than an expression of his opinion . . . is not fraud
or a material misrepresentation, unless made by (a) one
who has, or purports to have expert knowledge of the
matter, or (b) one whose manifestation is an intentional
misrepresentation and varies so far from the truth that no
reasonable man in his position could have such an opinion.”

7. See also id. § 471 cmt. b (“Misrepresentation without
conscious fault, and even without negligence often has the same
legal operation as fraud in giving the injured party a power
of avoidance . . . .”). Fraud matters for the consequence of a
misrepresentation; “materiality of the mistake induced by innocent
misrepresentation is essential while materiality is not essential if a
mistake induced by fraud produces the intended consequences.” Id.
§ 476 cmt. b. Because § 11 of the Securities Act requires materiality
as a separate element, misrepresentations that would otherwise
support an action under the 1933 Act would generally entitle the
purchaser to rescission in contract even without fraud.
8. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 376 (“A party
who has avoided a contract on the ground of . . . mistake [or]
misrepresentation . . . is entitled to restitution for any benefit that
he has conferred on the other party by way of part performance
or reliance.”).
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Id. § 474. This rule parallels the rule in tort, and it plainly
does not depend on subjective falsity. 9
Moreover, although the Restatement of Contracts
acknowledges that “[s]tatements that things are ‘good,’
‘valuable,’ ‘large,’ or ‘strong,’ necessarily involve an
exercise of individual judgment . . . the boundaries of
quality asserted by such statements . . . cannot be stretched
indefinitely.” Id. § 474 cmt. c.10 Opinions are false, in other
words, if they fall outside a zone of reasonableness. Finally,
comment d specifically deals with misstatements of law.
Although the general rule is that “[a] representation of a
rule of law . . . is inoperative,” the Restatement recognizes
exceptions where the statement is made by “a lawyer to
a layman, or by a person who may be supposed to have
expert knowledge of the special rule to one who is ignorant
of the subject.” Id. § 474 cmt. d.
The common law of restitution is linked to that of
contract; rescission and restitution, after all, is the remedy
9. See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 168 cmt. d
(“In some circumstances the recipient may reasonably understand
a statement of opinion to be more than an assertion as to the
maker’s state of mind. . . . [I]f the statement of opinion relates to
facts not known to the recipient, he may be justified in inferring
that there are facts that justify the opinion, or at least that there
are no facts that are incompatible with it. In such a case, the
statement of opinion becomes, in effect, an assertion as to those
facts and may be relied on as such.”).
10. See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 168 cmt. d
(recognizing that market practice accommodates some degree of
adversariness and puffery, but even in arms-length transactions,
“the other party is entitled to assume that a statement of opinion
is not so far removed from the truth as to be incompatible with
the facts known to the maker”) .
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for misrepresentation in contract. Unsurprisingly, the first
Restatement of Restitution includes a similarly capacious
concept of misrepresentation. In many circumstances,
“there is a right to restitution because of a mistake in
the conferring of a benefit. The mistake may be one of
law or of fact,” and it “may be the result of the fraud or
innocent inducement of the other party.” Restatement
of Restitution, Ch. 2 (“Mistake, Including Fraud”),
Introductory Note (1937). Remedies are not, in other
words, confined to circumstances involving scienter.
Section 28 states a similar rule to the one in contract:
“[a] person who has paid money to another because of a
mistake of fact and who does not obtain what he expected
in return is entitled to restitution from the other if the
mistake was induced . . . by the fraud of the payee, or .
. . by his innocent and material misrepresentation.” Id.
§ 28 (emphasis added). Likewise, restitution is available
in the event of a mistake of law if there is either fraud or
“justifiable reliance upon an innocent misrepresentation.”
Id. § 55(b).
The Restatement of Restitution generally provides
that representations of opinions are not fraudulent or
material, but excepts situations similar to those in the
Restatement of Contracts: “one standing in a fiduciary or
confidential relation to the person to whom [the statement]
is made”; “one who has, or purports to have, expert
knowledge of the matter”; or “one whose manifestation is
an intentional misrepresentation and varies so far from
the truth that no reasonable man in his position could have
such an opinion.” Id. §8(3).
Longstanding rules of both contract and restitution,
in other words, make clear that subjective falsity
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is not a prerequisite for rescissionary remedies for
misrepresentation, even when the misrepresentation
concerns a matter of opinion. And, as discussed in the next
section, the circumstances in which innocent statements
of opinion are actionable track the special obligations that
issuers of securities have to purchasers. Even if Congress
had meant the Securities Act only to track the common
law—rather than impose more rigorous obligations—it
would not have not assumed that subjective falsity is
required.
D.

Registration statements fit the exceptions in
which the common law imposed liability for
opinion statements.

The general common law structure we have sketched
involves a general principle that mere opinions are not
actionable combined with a relatively broad range of
exceptions to that principle. If it were generally true
that statements involving opinions can be false only in a
subjective sense—as Petitioners claim—then there would
be only one exception, for opinions not sincerely held.
But that is not the law. Rather, there are a number of
exceptions that operate where the reasons for the general
rule do not apply.
Those reasons are generally of three kinds: plaintiffs
do not (or may not justifiably) rely on opinion statements;
opinion statements are understood as part of a normal
“bargaining game”; and opinion statements are not
provably false. Dobbs, supra, § 477, at 1365. The established
exceptions, on the other hand, capture those situations
when reliance on a statement of opinion is reasonable
because of the relationship between the speaker and the
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recipient, the speaker’s expertise or access to information,
or the implication of underlying facts. 11
Congress intended the Securities Act to change
the rules of the “bargaining game” and to make the
statements included in registration materials worthy
of reliance. Moreover, by imposing due diligence and
disclosure obligations on issuers and associated persons,
Congress fostered the strong implication that issuers’
statements rested on due investigation of the underlying
facts.
First, the conclusions expressed in registration
statements imply the existence of underlying facts.
Virginia Bankshares recognized that this was frequently
true of statements in securities documents generally;
it is certainly true of Omnicare’s broad but conclusory
statement of legal compliance at issue here. The business
judgment rule includes “a presumption that in making a
business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis.” Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872
(Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812
(Del. 1984)). Corporate officers and directors, moreover,
11. See, e.g., 3 Samuel Williston, The Law of Contracts 2658
(1929):
[I]f a misstatement of opinion does not ordinarily
amount to actionable fraud it cannot be because the
statement is one of opinion merely, for misstatements
of opinion may be actionable; but rather because it is
unreasonable to place reliance on such statements
unless made by one who has, or purports to have,
expert knowledge or peculiar means of information not
accessible to the other party; and that it is assumed
that no reliance was placed on the statements unless
made by such a person.
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have duties under state corporate law to supervise the
corporation’s legal and regulatory compliance. See, e.g.,
In re Caremark, Inc. Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d
959 (Del. Ch. 1996).12 Readers of a registration statement
thus may presume its statements, including statements
about legal compliance, are informed by an adequate
investigation of the facts and law.
Second, issuers of securities do stand in a relation of
trust to prospective purchasers. Congress intended the
1933 Act to hold issuers to “high standards of trusteeship.”
H.R. Rep. No. 73-85 at 3 (1933); see also Shulman, supra,
at 252 (observing that § 11 “has extended the reach of the
duty . . . by denying “the defense available at common law
that the defendant was under no duty to the plaintiff”).
And as the United States points out in its brief, the
statute itself adopts common law fiduciary obligations as
the standard of reasonableness for the defenses in § 11(b)
(3). See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Vacatur and Remand, at 28 & n.5 (discussing
15 U.S.C. § 77k(c)).13
12. See also, e.g., Charles Hansen, The ALI Corporate
Governance Project: Of the Duty of Due Care and the Business
Judgment Rule, a Commentary, 41 Bus. Law. 1237, 1241 (1986)
(noting that “[u]nder corporate law . . . due care must be used in
ascertaining relevant facts and law before making the decision”).
13. See also SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375
U.S. 180, 195 (1963) (stating that under the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, which likewise involves a “fiduciary” standard of
care, “it would be logical to conclude that Congress codified
the common law ‘remedially’ as the courts had adapted it to the
prevention of fraudulent securities transactions by fiduciaries, not
‘technically’ as it has traditionally been applied in damage suits
between parties to arm’s-length transactions involving land and
ordinary chattels”).
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Third, the defendants in § 11 actions necessarily
enjoy much broader access to information about the
company than do prospective purchasers. That is why
the Act imposes broad disclosure obligations on issuers.
And people involved in the preparation of the registration
statement include not only the company’s officers but also
lawyers, auditors, and other financial professionals with
extensive expert knowledge. This is thus a paradigm case
in which recipients of opinion statements are entitled to
rely on expert opinion. As one court noted, “[t]he essential
objective of securities legislation is to protect those who
do not know market conditions from the overreachings
of those who do.” Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d
434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943).
Finally, securities law incorporates principles, such
as the good faith and due diligence defenses in § 11(b)(3),
that afford breathing room to opinions about valuation,
fairness, and other matters. These principles are bounded,
however; they refute the notion that there is no such
thing as an objective limit to opinions about securities
matters. After all, Congress intended the securities laws
to tighten the bounds of permissible salesmanship in the
registration context. As the leading treatise puts it, “[t]he
antifraud provisions are part of a statutory scheme that
resulted from . . . a congressional determination that the
public interest demanded legislation that would recognize
the gross inequality of bargaining power between the
professional securities fi rm and the average investor.”
Loss, et. al., supra, at 434.
The common law background thus strongly suggests
that Congress incorporated into the Securities Act the
longstanding exceptions to the general rule that opinions
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are non-actionable. And the continuing nuanced treatment
of opinion statements in common law settings belies
Petitioners’ categorical insistence that such statements
may be false only if they are not subjectively believed.
III. Statements of legal compliance are not matters of
opinion in the same sense as other statements.
Much of the discussion in this case has equated
statements of opinion in general with the statements of legal
compliance at issue in this particular dispute. Statements
about legal matters raise particular problems, however,
and the law often treats them distinctly. Petitioners assert
that “statements about legal compliance are by their very
nature statements of opinion,” Petitioners’ Brief at 35 n.10,
and that such statements “are necessarily infused with
the issuer’s judgment as to uncertain future events,” id.
at 33. Their categorical conclusion is that legal opinions
are simply subjective predictions about unknowable future
events:
Legal compliance is undeniably a “matter of
judgment.” A legal opinion given today could
change or be rendered obsolete tomorrow.
An assertion of legal compliance cannot be
definitively true or false at the time it is made
except in the rare case in which a court has
already defi nitively ruled on the legality of
the issuer’s actions. The ultimate accuracy of
the stated belief hinges on future events and
the decisions of judges, juries, and regulators.
Assessing legal compliance thus calls for an
exercise of judgment about unknowable future
events.
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Id. at 34-35. This is an extraordinary thing for lawyers
to say about the law. It takes Justice Holmes’ famous
assertion that law is simply “the prophecies of what the
courts will do in fact”14 and adds a proposition that Holmes
rejected—that is, that what the courts will do is in fact
no more predictable than, say, whether the stock market
will go up or down.15
If Petitioners are right that legal opinions simply
cannot be objectively false—that they can be false only if
they misrepresent the speaker’s subjective belief—then
it is unclear on what basis they can argue that the Sixth
Circuit got the law wrong in this case. But Petitioners are
not right. There are, to be sure, purely legal questions
upon which the currently-existing legal materials do not
provide a definitive answer, and there are also questions
of the application of law to fact that inevitably involve the
exercise of judgment. As scholars, amici endeavor to teach
our classes in such a way as to identify both those areas
where the law is settled and clear and those in which it
is open to honest debate. But the existence of gray areas
does not establish that gray is all there is.
In this case, Respondents alleged that Petitioners’
statements that Omnicare was in compliance with
applicable state and federal laws, and that in particular
14. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv.
L. Rev. 457, 460-61 (1897).
15. See id. at 461-62 (affi rming that “[w]hen we study law
we are not studying a mystery but a well known profession”
and expressing optimism that legal thought can “make these
prophecies more precise, and . . . generalize them into a thoroughly
connected system”).
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its relationships with pharmaceutical companies were
legal and valid, were false because Omnicare was in
fact providing illegal kickbacks to those companies.
Petitioners’ statements of legal compliance might be
understood as conveying one of three things: (1) that
although kickbacks are illegal, Omnicare was not engaged
in any version of that practice; (2) that although Omnicare
was providing kickbacks, kickbacks are not illegal under
the applicable law, or (3) that the relationships Omnicare
had with pharmaceuticals did not amount to kickbacks.
The fi rst sense would amount to a representation of fact,
even though stated as a matter of legal compliance. As
such, it would be actionable if objectively false in the same
sense as non-legal opinions that imply the existence of
particular facts.
The second understanding of Petitioners’ statements
would be a pure statement about the content of the law,
and the third a statement about the application of law to
fact. Both (2) and (3) are opinions in the sense that they
involve some degree of judgment. But the common law has
long allowed reliance on such statements in circumstances
analogous to those here. Moreover, doctrines throughout
the law—from qualified immunity to Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—differentiate between
legal opinions that are within the zone of legitimate
disagreement and those that fall outside it.
Both the common law and the Securities Act provide
specific tools to protect opinions on genuinely uncertain
legal matters from incurring liability. But the law’s content
and its application are often knowable and determinate,
and in these cases lawyers and other actors are frequently
held liable if they misinterpret or misstate its commands.
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It is accordingly open to this Court to decide this case
in terms of the proper treatment of legal opinions under
the Securities Act, without necessarily assimilating those
opinions to other sorts of opinions, such as judgments
whether a price is “high” or a transaction is “fair.”
A.

Statements of legal opinion often imply the
existence of particular facts, misrepresentations
of which may incur liability.

In tort, “the general rule is that, as between parties
bearing no fiduciary relation to each other, a mere
misrepresentation of law by one party, or a mere mistake
of law by the other party, is no ground for relief.” Pieh v.
Flitton, 211 N.W. 964 (Minn. 1927). But like all statements
of opinion, statements of legal opinion may imply the
existence of certain facts. The statement that “I was
in legal compliance with the speed limit on my way to
work this morning,” for example, would be understood
as a statement of fact—that is, that the speaker was
driving at a speed lower than the posted limit—rather
than an opinion about the law, simply because the legal
elements are both obvious and uncontested.16 If the other
elements of a misrepresentation claim were met, the false
implication of fact would be sufficient to establish liability.
The common law of torts has long recognized that
“[i]f a misrepresentation as to a matter of law includes,
expressly or by implication, a misrepresentation of fact, the
16. The speaker would not ordinarily be understood to be
saying, for instance, that he was in fact driving 100 mph but had
a good faith belief that the posted speed limit was invalid under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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recipient is justified in relying upon the misrepresentation
of fact to the same extent as though it were any other
misrepresentation of fact.” Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 545; see also Seeger v. Odell, 115 P.2d 977, 980 (Cal. 1941)
(“If . . . the opinion or legal conclusion misrepresents the
facts upon which it is based or implies the existence of
facts which are nonexistent, it constitutes an actionable
misrepresentation.”).17 This section treats statements of
law as pure statements of opinion only “if all the pertinent
facts are known and there is no misrepresentation of the
existence or nonexistence of a pertinent statute or judicial
decision.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 545 cmt. a.
Courts acting in accord with this rule have held that when
one party has special knowledge of the facts not available
to the other, it will treat a statement of legal compliance
as a representation of fact. See, e.g., Sorenson v. Gardner,
334 P.2d 471, 474 (Or. 1959) (“This is not a case to which
the maxim that ignorance of the law excuses no one can be
applied. The plaintiffs are not relying on their ignorance
of the law but of the facts, and the alleged representations
carried with them the implication that the facts were
otherwise than the evidence shows them to have been.”).
Contract law applies an identical rule. See Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 170 cmt. b (acknowledging that a
statement about the law “may, as may any other statement
of opinion, carry with it the assertion that the facts known
to the maker are not incompatible with his opinion, or that
he does know facts that justify him in forming it”).
17. See also Restatement of Torts § 545 (articulating an
identical rule); Dobbs, supra, § 478, at 1368 (“Some statements
of law may actually state or at least imply facts that are provably
false and if so they are actionable on the same grounds as other
factual statements.”).
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On the facts of this case, Omnicare’s statement that it
was in legal compliance implied that it was not engaged in
any practices that would plainly be illegal. The registration
statement did not go into detail concerning Omnicare’s
relationships with pharmaceutical companies; it did not,
in terms of the common law rule, provide a factual basis
upon which the recipient of its statement could draw its
own legal conclusions. This brings Omnicare within the
rule of Restatement § 545—that is, it is liable if the facts
implied by its representation of legality turn out to be
objectively untrue.
B. Statements about the content or application
of the law itself may be actionable under the
common law, and they may be objectively false
if they fall outside the bound of legitimate
disagreement.
The general rule treating statements of law as
non-actionable opinions applies more readily where the
representation reflects a judgment about the content of
the law or the proper application of that law to particular
facts. That rule is not without exception, however; in fact,
§ 545 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts makes clear
that “[i]f a misrepresentation as to a matter of law is only
one of opinion as to the legal consequences of facts, the
recipient is justified in relying upon it to the same extent
as though it were a representation of any other opinion.”
Hence “[i]t is not universally true that a misrepresentation
of the law is not binding upon the party who made it. . .
. Where one who has had superior means of information
professes a knowledge of the law, and thereby obtains an
unconscionable advantage of another who is ignorant and
has not been in a situation to become informed, the injured
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party is entitled to relief as well as if the misrepresentation
had been concerning matter of fact.” Rusch v. Wald, 232
N.W. 875, 876 (Wis. 1930) (quoting 1 Melville M. Bigelow,
A Treatise on the Law of Fraud on Its Civil Side 488
(1888)). Likewise, the general exceptions for speakers who
stand in special relationships of trust to the recipient apply
likewise to statements of law. See Bigelow, supra, at 488.
Moreover, the common law of torts imposes special
obligations on lawyers. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts cites Sainsbury v. Pennsylvania Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 183 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1950), which noted that
“[t]he rule is also well established that when a lawyer
makes a misrepresentation of law to a layman relief may
be afforded, even though the layman knows the lawyer
represents an antagonistic interest. Any other rule would
be unconscionable.” Id. at 550-51 (citing Rusch, 232 N.W.
at 876, and Restatement of Torts § 545 cmt. d (1938)).18
When a stock registration statement, often written by
and certainly reviewed by lawyers, purports to offer
a judgment on the legality of the issuing company’s
activities, laypersons are entitled to rely on that judgment.
Contract law likewise does not distinguish in principle
between misstatements of fact and misstatements of law.
Section 170 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
which is based on § 545 of the Restatement (Second)
18. See also Dobbs, supra, § 478, at 1368 (“If false and
uttered by a lawyer as an expert, [statements of opinions about
legal consequences of a given action] may be actionable as false
statements of fact because they imply that the lawyer both holds
the opinion and has a basis for it; uttered by a layman who has no
special knowledge or fiduciary obligation it is probably protected
as opinion.”) (emphasis added).
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of Torts, maintains that “[i]f an assertion is one as to a
matter of law, the same rules that apply in the case of other
assertions determine whether the recipient is justified
in relying on it.” Contract law, like tort law, imposes
special obligations on lawyers and persons purporting to
apply legal expertise. See id. cmt. b (“[I]f the maker of
the representation purports to have special expertise in
the law which the recipient does not have, reliance on the
opinion may be justified (§ 167(b)). If a lawyer states his
opinion of law to a layman, the layman is entitled to assume
his professional honesty and may justifiably rely on his
opinion even though the two have an adverse relation in
negotiating a contract. Even if the maker is not a lawyer,
he may purport to have special knowledge that will enable
him to form a reliable opinion. . . .”).
Courts have been skeptical, moreover, of the
proposition that statements of legal compliance amount
to statements of opinion at all, at least in ordinary
circumstances. In Municipal Metallic Bed Mfg. Corp. v.
Dobbs, 171 N.E. 75 (N.Y. 1930), for example, the New York
Court of Appeals held that a tenant could sue based on a
landlord’s misrepresentation that manufacturing was a
lawful use of the property. In that case, the court wrote,
“we have something more than a representation of law
which is to be taken as the expression of an opinion only.
The landlords assume to guarantee that their building
may lawfully be used for the purposes for which it was
leased. If any presumption exists, it is that the landlord
knows whether his building complies with the zoning laws
and factory regulations. The tenant is not left to his own
judgment, but may rely on the contract of the landlord.” Id.
at 76. The same court later read this opinion to exemplify
“a sharp distinction between a pure opinion of law which
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may not, except in unusual circumstances, base an action
in tort, and a mixed statement of fact as to what the law
is or whether it is applicable.” Nat’l Conversion Corp. v.
Cedar Building Corp., 246 N.E.2d 351, 355 (N.Y. 1969);
see also Crowther v. Guidone, 441 A.2d 11, 13 (Conn.
1981) (“To require the representation to be made as a
statement of fact . . . is quite different than to require that
the statement be factual as opposed to legal.”).
This skepticism makes sense, because in many
instances a statement about the content of the law or its
application to particular facts is not a matter of legitimate
dispute. The statement “the speed limit on that highway is
55 miles per hour” is a statement of fact notwithstanding
that it concerns the content of the law. Likewise, the
statement that “the police’s warrantless use of thermal
imaging to look inside a private residence is unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment” is not simply a statement
of opinion, because this Court has settled that question.
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). Before
Kyllo, however, the same statement might well have been
properly viewed as a matter of opinion. The extent to which
statements of law should be treated as opinion or fact
depends largely on how settled the law and its applications
are in particular areas.
Contrary to Petitioners’ suggestion, the law does not
simply throw up its hands in the face of some degree of
legal indeterminacy and treat all legal questions as open
to dispute. The jurisprudence of qualified immunity, for
example, demonstrates the law’s ability to distinguish
between legitimate legal uncertainty and “clearly
established law.” See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 817 (1982). Likewise, courts impose sanctions
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on attorneys for failing to cite controlling adverse
precedent under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 notwithstanding that
“attorneys are legitimately entitled to press their own
interpretations of precedent, including interpretations
which render particular cases inapplicable”; sanctions are
justified when these efforts pass the bounds of legitimate
argument. Jorgenson v. Cty. of Volusia, 846 F.2d 1350,
1352 (11th Cir. 1988). And Congress has instructed federal
courts entertaining habeas corpus petitions to identify
state court decisions that “involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409
(2000) (clarifying that the inquiry is whether the state
court’s decision was “objectively unreasonable”). Each of
these standards requires the courts to respect an area of
legitimate disagreement—one in which lawyers may hold
differing opinions about the content or the application of
the law—but also to police its outer boundaries.
This Court currently has before it a case involving
whether a police officer may base “reasonable suspicion”
upon a mistake of law. See Heien v. North Carolina, No.
13-604. Amici express no view on the proper resolution
of that case. We note, however, that even North Carolina
concedes both that the reasonableness of the officer’s
mistake is an objective question and that mistakes of law
should be excused only within narrow bounds. See Brief
for the Respondent at 16-17, Heien v. North Carolina, No.
13-604 (July 2014). North Carolina does not maintain that
legal judgments are simply matters of opinion. Judgments
about the law can be true, false, or sometimes uncertain,
and all across the law—from tort to contract to qualified
immunity to habeas—courts manage to tell the difference.
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C.

The securities laws contain ample mechanisms
for protecting legal opinions on legitimately
contested questions.

The examples given show that courts can determine
the existence and boundaries of leg itimate legal
disagreement. Those examples should not, of course,
determine the proper standard for assessing such
disagreement under the securities laws. Qualified
immunity jurisprudence is quite protective of defendants’
erroneous legal judgments for very good reasons: the
defendants generally are not lawyers; they must make
on-the-spot legal judgments under difficult conditions; and
the costs of over-deterrence are high. Likewise, Rule 11
applies a gentle standard in order to encourage vigorous
advocacy, and § 2254(d) shields state courts’ applications
of law to fact for federalism reasons.
Section 11 of the Securities Act, however, exists at
the opposite end of the spectrum from these examples.
It applies only to statements included in the registration
statement—a highly formal document painstakingly
prepared and reviewed by numerous professionals,
including skilled attorneys. As already discussed,
Congress intended to impose a strong obligation of
due diligence in the preparation of these statements;
hence the imposition of strict liability for erroneous or
misleading statements in the registration materials.
And state corporate law imposes additional obligations
of investigation and oversight. The reasons for according
relatively broad leeway for erroneous legal judgments by,
say, a cop on the beat do not apply here.

32
Section 11 also has a built-in mechanism for shielding
persons other than the issuer itself from liability based
on good-faith judgments about uncertain questions of law.
Section 11(b)(3) provides a complete defense to liability
for persons who, “after reasonable investigation, have
reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time
such part of the registration statement became effective,
that the statements therein were true.” See also Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208 & n.26 (1976).
This Court need not determine the precise degree
of uncertainty necessary to render a statement of
legal compliance a non-falsifi able opinion under § 11.
Petitioners moved to dismiss on the ground that failure
to allege Omnicare’s statements of legal compliance were
subjectively false disposed of Respondents’ claims. See
Respondents’ Brief at 56-58. That is plainly incorrect. The
parties have not yet litigated whether the legal compliance
issues presented by this particular case fall within a
zone of legal ambiguity such that Omnicare’s statements
amounted to pure opinion. Nor have they litigated whether
Omnicare’s statements implied certain underlying facts
or fell into one of the other well-recognized categories
in which even opinion statements are actionable. It
is sufficient to resolve this appeal that, contrary to
Petitioners’ view, statements of legal compliance may
involve assertions that are objectively falsifiable.
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CONCLUSION
The court of appeals’ judgment should be affi rmed.
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